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Abstract
The world’s digital transformation has influenced not
only the way we do business, but also the way we
perform daily activities. Social media, for instance,
has clearly showed us the influence it has on people,
especially during social events such as elections. In fact,
the past Presidential elections in the United States as
well as those in Great Britain (Brexit) and in Colombia
(peace agreement referendum) has stablished that social
media play an important part in modern politics. In fact,
the digital political field expresses in the digital world
through political movements and political candidates
looking for popular support (number of followers),
regular citizens’ messages discussing social issues
(trending topics flooding social media), or even political
propaganda in favor or against politicians or political
movements (advertisement).
One of the issues with social media in the digital era is
the presence of automatic accounts (bots) that artificially
fill accounts with fake followers, create false trending
topics, and share fake news or simply flood the net with
propaganda. All this artificial information may influence
people and sometimes may even censor people’s real
opinions undermining their freedom of speech.
In this paper, we propose a methodology to track elec-
tions and a set of tools used to collect and analyze elec-
tion data. In particular, this paper discusses our experi-
ences during the Presidential Elections in Ecuador that
were held in 2017. In fact, we show how all presidential
candidates prepared an online campaign in social media
(Twitter) and how the political campaign completely al-
tered the normal subscription of followers. Furthermore,
we discuss that the high presence of followers during
the period between the first and second round of elec-
tions may be altered by automatic accounts. Finally, we
use bot detection systems and gathered more than 30,000
bots which were filtered by political motivated content.
In our data analysis, we show that these bots were mainly
used for propaganda purposes in favor or against a par-
ticular candidate.
1 Introduction
According to Freedom House, Ecuador’s Internet free-
dom ranks as partially free [8]. Despite the infrastructure
investment that the government has made in the past
decade, the major problem the country is facing is
the control and blockage of content due to copyright
infringement targeted to political activists [8].
For the first time in a decade, Ecuador lived a
transition in its government. Rafael Correa, former
president of Ecuador, for the first time in ten years
was no longer a viable candidate for a new presidential
period. Therefore, new candidates from several parties
participated during the 2017 presidential elections [4].
In addition, recent events regarding elections around
the world such as the Brexit, the peace agreement refer-
endum in Colombia, and the presidential elections in the
United States marked a new political environment in the
world due to the influence of social media [9, 1]. In fact,
The New York Times has a series of news regarding how
Russia interfered in the 2016 US Presidential Elections
through manipulating social media targeting people
emotions and preferences [10].
Hence, the new political environment in the Ecuado-
rian elections attracted several candidates. Elections in
Ecuador were held in two rounds: the first round with 8
candidates on February, 19th 2017, and the second round
with two candidates: Lenin Moreno and Guillermo
Lasso on April, 2nd 2017.
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In this work, we show the study we conducted before
and during the presidential elections in Ecuador. We
present a clear overview of how presidential candidates
used the cyberspace to promote their candidacies and
the presence of several bots, detected using third party
systems for bot detection, such as DeBot [3], that shared
political content against and in favor of candidates.
Our strategy consisted of three phases: pre-electoral,
campaign and post-electoral. The rest of the paper is or-
ganized as follows: first we describe how elections in
Ecuador work, then we provide a detail explanation of
the phases, methodologies and tools used for tracking the
elections in the cyberspace (Twitter). We present the re-
sults of our Twitter analysis in two scenarios: candidate
account analysis and bot detection analysis. Finally, we
present a few conclusions and talk about the future work
to enhance our approach.
2 The 2017 Presidential Elections in
Ecuador
Presidential elections in Ecuador are held every four
years since the country returned to a democratic system
in 1979. Ever since, there has not been any former
president reelected, until 2006 where Rafael Correa
ran for presidency and stayed in office until 2017.
In fact, during 1996 and 2006 the country suffered a
complex political instability which caused to have five
different presidents in that decade. Hence, tracking the
Ecuadorian Elections in 2017 is an important landmark
in terms of Ecuador’s young democratic system. In
addition, these elections are especially important due
to the presence of new technologies such as social
media and a strong political party, Alianza Paı´s, which
supported Rafael Correa for ten years in office.
In general terms, presidential elections in Ecuador are
mandatory for all Ecuadorian citizens. It consists of two
rounds that are held in dates selected by “Consejo Na-
cional Electoral”, CNE (the state institution responsible
for holding elections in the country). If any candidate
is able to obtain more than 40% of people’s popular
vote (after correcting for invalid ballots) and if he or
she has at least ten percent points over the second is
declared President in the first round. Otherwise, the two
with higher ballots go for a second round of popular
elections, where the one who gets more than 50% of the
ballots is declared President of Ecuador.
The 2017 Presidential Elections held in Ecuador took
place in February 19th, and the second round in April 2nd .
In the first round, eight parties and political movements
Candidate Votes
Lenı´n Moreno 39.36%
Guillermo Lasso 28.09%
Cynthia Viteri 16.32%
Paco Moncayo 6.71%
Abdala´ Bucaram 4.82%
Iva´n Espinel 3.18%
Patricio Zuquilanda 0.77%
Washington Pesa´ntez 0.75%
Table 1: Results of the first round of elections [4].
inscribed their candidacies: Cynthia Viteri / Mauricio
Pozo (Partido Social Cristiano), Abdala´ Bucaram Pulley
/ Ramiro Aguilar (Partido Fuerza Ecuador), Iva´n Espinel
/ Doris Quiroz (Fuerza Compromiso Social), Guillermo
Lasso / Andre´s Pa´ez (Movimiento CREO & Movimiento
SUMA), Lenı´n Moreno / Jorge Glas (Movimiento
Alianza Paı´s), Paco Moncayo / Monserratt Bustamante
(Izquierda Democra´tica & Movimiento Unidad Popular
& Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik),
Washington Pesa´ntez / Alex Alcı´var (Movimiento Unio´n
Ecuatoriana), and Patricio Zuquilanda / Johnnie Jorgge
A´lava (Partido Sociedad Patrio´tica) [4].
After the first round, no candidate obtained the re-
quired votes, therefore a second round of elections was
held in April 2nd (see table 1), where Lenı´n Moreno
was elected President of Ecuador and the runner up was
Guillermo Lasso (see table 2) [4].
Candidate Votes
Lenı´n Moreno 51.16%
Guillermo Lasso 48.84%
Table 2: Results of the second round of elections [4].
3 Measuring political content in social me-
dia
From the experience in other elections around the world,
and the strong claims by political activists in Ecuador
that the government were manipulating public opinion
on local social media [11, 6, 5, 12], we set our main
objective to track political content on social media
and measure censorship or interference by automatic
accounts (bots) during the presidential elections.
We chose Twitter since it is a widely used social
media in Ecuador with over 2,000,000 active users [7].
In fact, Twitter has become an important social media
that in the past decade, the former President replied to
2
people’s requests from his personal Twitter account.
In the following subsections, we introduce the
methodology used, the tools we used to collect bot infor-
mation, and the tools we developed to analyze the data
gathered from January to April 2017.
3.1 Methodology
Our methodology consists of dividing the electoral year
in phases: pre-electoral, campaign and post-electoral. In
the case of the 2017 Presidential elections in Ecuador,
we starting planning our experiments in August 2016.
The main problem we encountered is that measuring
anything in social media requires establishing a base
line. Therefore, we designed the pre-electoral phase in
order to collect all data in advance before any political
party or political movement made an official announce-
ment of their presidential candidate. We selected over
100 special accounts and started following their activity
on Twitter.
We planned two main experiments: data recollection
for bot analysis, and data recollection for special ac-
counts analysis. For the first experiment, we collected
and classified data from November to December 2016
related to political events in the country. We filtered the
trending topics as well as the most common words used
in social media to describe political events and gener-
ated a list of potential political topics which included
potential candidate names, name of political parties and
movements, name of political scandals, etc. This list was
used into the Twitter API to feed DeBot, which is the
tool we used to search for automatic accounts. DeBot
is an unsupervised bot classifier developed by Chavoshi
et al.[3, 2]. DeBot works in two phases: first, it listens
to users mentioning a list of keywords and it creates a
set of potential bots based on each account behavior.
Second, it listens the activity of each potential bot for
a few hours and creates a signal based on its activity.
Later, DeBot calculates the correlation among accounts
and determines which ones are related and place them
in clusters [2]. Please see figure 1 where we show three
political bots promoting a particular candidate during
the campaign.
Our second experiment consisted of tracking all spe-
cial accounts on Twitter. We collected snapshots of Twit-
ter followers from a set of selected accounts (picked
through a previous analysis of Ecuador’s political sit-
uation) conformed by political parties and movements,
government institutions, and political personalities (po-
tential candidates, political activists, and active politi-
cians). The graph was collected using the Twitter API
and required almost two days in order to traverse the list
of accounts without exceeding Twitter rate limits.
3.2 Phase 1: Pre-electoral phase
The pre-electoral phase started in November to Decem-
ber 2016 for our first experiment. We gathered hundreds
of trending topics and started to collect bots from
January 2017. The base line we established was the list
of trending topics related to politics that were analyzed
and validated by an Ecuadorian citizen knowledgable in
politics.
For our second experiment, the base line was estab-
lished by collecting the first graph in January 2017. As
we will see later in our results, the base line in this case
was not perfect, because new candidates emerged in the
very last month before elections.
3.3 Phase 2: Campaign
During the campaign, we kept our bot analyzer running
every single day gathering potential bots. We refreshed
the database containing trending topics related to politics
based on emergent topics that were not considered in
our base line.
For our second experiment, we gathered a second
snapshot of the graph of all special accounts. We also
added those accounts that we did not considered in our
base line. The second snapshot was taken one day before
the first round of elections, February 18th 2017.
3.4 Phase 3: Post-electoral phase
For our post electoral phase, we kept DeBot running until
the end of April 2017. And, we gathered a third snapshot
of all followers of our special accounts, also by the end
of April.
4 Results
We present our results in two sections: bot analysis and
twitter graph analysis.
5 Bot Analysis
DeBot collected 32,672 bots from January to April 2017.
Figure 2 show the distribution of these bots every day
from January to April 2017. These bots interacted more
in business hours and collectively increased their activity
close to the election days. In particular, we ran a clas-
sification analysis on all the collected bots in order to
3
Figure 1: Example of automatic accounts detected by DeBot during the 2017 Presidential Elections in Ecuador.
understand what they were promoting during the cam-
paign. We gathered all keywords used by all the tweets
we were able to collect from each bot and match positive
keywords in favor to a candidate and negative keywords
against of a candidate. This classification was performed
by ranking the keywords by which were the most men-
tioned to the least and having our expert validate whether
a keyword was in favor or against a certain candidate. We
later clustered all tweets produced by bots in these cate-
gories and generated figure 3.
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Figure 2: Total political bots detected during the 2017
Presidential Elections in Ecuador.
6 Graph Analysis
For this experiment, we considered the differences
among graphs in time. We calculated all new accounts
following each candidate from the pre-electoral phase
into the campaign, and from the campaign into the
post-electoral phase. We found the most change in the
first graph difference. Table 6 shows the transition that
the Twitter accounts of Presidential candidates suffered
in the lapse of a month (January to February). We have
included former President, Rafael Correa, to the list
because, even though he was not a candidate, he had an
extremely active set of followers in Twitter.
In addition, we compare the three main candidate
twitter accounts according to their final vote (see table
1) and show in both a cumulative distribution of the
date of creation of each new follower and observe a
particular pattern from the day the official campaign
started (February 1st to the second round of elections
(April 2nd). Figures 4 and 5 show how the patterns of the
main candidates increase the number of recently created
accounts during the campaign.
Finally, we compare the twitter accounts of official
candidates (those that belong to the same political move-
ment as former President Rafael Correa) with Rafael
Correa’s twitter account. We found that even though,
Rafael Correa was not a candidate, he had an even higher
follower activity during the campaign. In fact, figures 6
and 7 show how Rafael Correa twitter account increases
the number of recently created accounts during the cam-
4
Candidate’s Name User Account Phase 1 - Followers Phase 2 - Followers Difference Increase %
Cynthia Viteri @CynthiaViteri6 99,669 117,634 17,965 18.02%
Dalo Bucara´m @daloes10 324,443 330,189 5,746 1,77%
Iva´n Espinel @IvanEspinelM N/A 10,287 N/A N/A
Guillermo Lasso @LassoGuillermo 244,990 259,444 14,454 5.90%
Lenı´n Moreno @Lenin 4,462 126,791 122,329 2,741.57%
Rafael Correa @MashiRafael 2,877,737 3,002,662 124,925 4,34%
Paco Moncayo @PacoMoncayo 10,352 22,988 12,636 122.06%
Washington Pesa´ntez @PesantezOficial 1,807 2,021 214 11.84%
Patricio Zuquilanda @ZuquilandaDuque N/A 1,562 N/A N/A
Table 3: Account follower differences among campaign and pre-electoral phases.
Twitter Bots messages during the campaign
45.86% - Lenin Moreno / Jorge Glas
09.73% - Paco Moncayo / Monserratt Bustamante
09.35% - Cynthia Viteri / Mauricio Pozo
06.66% - Guillermo Lasso / Andres Paez
00.16% - Ivan Espinel / Doris Quiroz
06.69% - Against Lasso-Paez
01.86% - Against Viteri-Pozo
01.18% - Against Moreno-Glas
00.04% - Against Bucaram-Aguilar
18.47% - Diverse (opinion-other political topics)
Figure 3: Twitter bots messages during the campaign.
Lighter colors represent positive messages about a can-
didate, darker colors represent negative messages about
a candidate.
paign in about 5 times those from Lenı´n Moreno’s and
Jorge Glas’ twitter accounts.
7 Conclusions
For the first time in any election in Ecuador, we present
strong evidence that automatic accounts are used by
political parties and movements to promote their can-
didates. We show how these automatic accounts have
been used to promote or discredit other candidates. In
fact, we show how almost 46% of all bots collected
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Figure 4: Cumulative view: graph difference analysis of
new follower accounts’ date of creation in time. Blue
line shows Guillermo Lasso’s twitter account, red shows
Lenı´n Moreno’s twitter account and green shows Cynthia
Viteri’s twitter account
supported the official candidate, Lenı´n Moreno, and that
other candidates such as Guillermo Lasso received bad
press for almost every single positive tweet in his favor.
Additionally, we show with concern how the political
campaign flooded Twitter with thousands of accounts
that were recently created to support candidates. We
understand that once we obtain the difference graph
from our campaign data from the pre-electoral phase,
our comparisons should accentuate the final period were
new activity happened in Twitter, but the increasing
slope of new followers in the main candidates and in
the account of Rafael Correa alerts about the nature
of such accounts and therefore demands further research.
Finally, it is clear that all candidates with no exception
understood the importance of the digital era in politics.
All of them prepared twitter accounts and their accounts
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Figure 5: Activity view: graph difference analysis of
new follower accounts’ date of creation in time. Blue
line shows Guillermo Lasso’s twitter account, red shows
Lenı´n Moreno’s twitter account and green shows Cynthia
Viteri’s twitter account.
increased their followers during the campaign. It is im-
portant to mention that even though we gathered data for
the post electoral phase, since the campaign and the post-
electoral phase were very close to each other, we were
unable to see any significant differences.
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